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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
One of the major issues facing the international community today is
how to deal with the rising threat of terrorism. The use of terrorism as a
political weapon has expanded to virtually every geographic and political
area of the world. The past year offers an example of the extent and fre-
quency of the terrorist problem. In September 1984, the American em-
bassy annex in East Beruit was virtually destroyed by a terrorist truck
bomb.' In October 1984, an assassination attempt was made on Britain's
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, between September 1 and
October 19, 1984, 41 acts of terrorism were perpetrated by no fewer than
14 terrorist groups against the people and property of 21 countries.'
This recent rise in the phenomenon of the use of terrorism as a polit-
ical weapon can be attributed to two factors. First, new developments in
technology, such as the increased sophistication of the mass media, now
permit the terrorist's message to be disseminated throughout the world
virtually minutes after a terrorist operation is undertaken. New develop-
ments in technology have provided the terrorist with powerful new weap-
ons and more reliable means from which to escape. Thus, by using terror-
ist tactics, an individual or group can now obtain concessions from the
nations of the world which in the past were more difficult to gain.3
* Mr. Intoccia is now an Air Force captain assigned to the Staff Judge Advocate's Of-
fice, Bergstrom A.F.B., Texas. B.S. 1978, U.S. Air Force Academy; M.A. 1981, Wichita State
University; J.D. 1985, University of Denver. Mr. Intoccia wrote this article while a student
at the University of Denver. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Air University,
the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
1. This was the third major attack on American interests in Lebanon in the past three
years.
2. 84 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2093, Dec., 1984, at 86.
3. Sloan and Wise, Countering Terrorism: The U.S. and Israeli Approach, 9:3 MIDDLE
E. REV. 55 (1977).
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A second factor contributing to the growth in terrorism is that the
cost in employing such tactics is rather minimal. Terrorist acts can be
executed by a small number of persons. By aiming primarily at civilians,
the potential list of unprotected targets is endless and such targets are
readily available. Where the terrorist operation takes place in a country
that is not concerned with the political goal to which the terrorist aspires,
there tends to be a limited reaction from that country to the terrorist
attack.' In short, because new developments in technology lend them-
selves favorably to terrorist methods, and because of the low cost in-
volved in using such methods, terrorism has become a useful device for
achieving even the most minor political benefits.
Recognizing that terrorism is an increasingly dangerous phenomenon,
the United States government is actively searching for an adequate re-
sponse to terrorism. To date, American policy has assumed a defensive
posture, yet its underlying philosophy is based on unyielding firmness in
dealing with terrorists. For instance, the United States believes that
yielding to terrorist demands only increases and encourages subsequent
acts of terrorism. The government will not pay ransom nor will it yield
concessions to terrorists.5
Despite this policy, it has become increasingly apparent to American
decision-makers that the present policy is inadequate. This growing reali-
zation has led to a search for more effective methods of dealing with the
terrorist problem. Perhaps no clearer reflection of this new attitude can
be found than in the recent speech given by United States Secretary of
State George Shultz before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City
on October 25, 1984. Because of the sharp new policy direction the Secre-
tary proposed, that speech will be used in this article as a vehicle to ex-
plore the international legal implications of an active counter-terrorist
policy. It is the contention of this writer that such a national approach to
the problem of terrorism contains, at least in part, serious legal and policy
problems. As such, modifications should be made to the approach pro-
posed. The purpose of this article is to examine those international prin-
ciples and policies concerning the use of unilateral economic and military
measures as they are applied to the specific problems in American efforts
to control international terrorism. The article addresses the extent to
which the United States may, consistent with principles of international
law, or should, consistent with the best interests of nations, engage in
self-help' activities against states that support acts of international
terrorism.
In order to address these questions, this article will first highlight the
major aspects of the speech given by Secretary Shultz. The article will
4. Id. at 56.
5. Id. at 57-58.
6. "Self-help" is used here to describe the situation where an injured state unilaterally
takes measures to protect itself and its nationals.
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then attempt to explain why Shultz and others feel a unilateral approach
toward solving the terrorist problem should be taken. Then, the discus-
sion will turn to a legal analysis of the approach proposed by the Shultz
speech. The last part of the discussion will analyze the policy implications
of adopting the proposed counter-terrorist strategy.
A. The Shultz Speech on Terrorism
Recognizing the inadequacy of existing U.S. policy in dealing with
the problem of international terrorism, Secretary Shultz's speech of Octo-
ber 25, 1984 called for more active counter-measures in dealing with the
terrorist problem, and asked for a broad national commitment to counter
the threat of terrorism. 7 The "essence of our response," Shultz stated, "is
simple to state: violence and aggression must be met with firm resis-
tance."8 The best deterrent to terrorism, he stated, is the "certainty that
swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it."9
In order to understand what Shultz meant by a "firm resistance" pol-
icy, a closer examination of the speech is necessary. The speech embraces
a policy that contains several elements. (A) Israel as an Example. The
speech urges that the methods used by the state of Israel in dealing with
terrorism should be followed. Pointing out that "no nation has had more
experience with terrorism than Israel,"' 0 and that "Israel has won major
battles in the war against terrorism,"' Shultz asserted that "nations of
the world would do well to follow Israel's example [of how to deal with
terrorism]."" (B) Broader International Effort. The speech calls for a
broader international effort, and pledges that the United States "will
work whenever possible in close cooperation with our friends in the de-
mocracies."'" (C) Economic Sanctions. The speech calls for sanctions, im-
plicitly economic in nature, to "isolate, weaken, or punish states that
sponsor terrorism against [the United States]."' 4 (D) Armed Reprisal.
The speech calls for the use of Shultz urges that preemptive action be
employed to "stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act."'" His
speech indicates that unpredictability and surprise are elements that a
counter-terrorist policy should incorporate. The speech specifically calls
for retaliation where there is "an attack on our people.'" The speech ad-
vocates flexibility in response at the "times and places of our own choos-
ing.' 7 (E) Non-Courtroom Evidence. The speech asserts that there may
7. Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T STATE BULL., supra note 2, at 15.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id.
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exist the need to respond militarily though U.S. officials may not have the
"kind of evidence [of terrorist activity] that can stand up in an American
court of law.""8
B. The Desire for Unilateral Action Against Terrorism
Secretary Shultz's call for a more active unilateral policy in dealing
with the terrorist problem reflects a growing attitude among policy-mak-
ers that international agreements do not have the capability to effectively
deal with these matters. Despite adoption of rules by the United Na-
tions1 ' and other bodies20 which clearly outlaw international terrorism,
18. Id. One final element in the proposed policy was an increased American intelligence
capability. Because of the breadth of that subject, it will not be addressed in this article.
19. For instance, several conventions have been adopted regarding aviation hijacking.
The 1963 Tokyo Convention requires parties to the convention to return any hijacked plane
and passengers. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963 f1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768. The 1970 Hague Convention
contains language that states parties must either extradite or prosecute hijackers. Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970 [1971] 22 U.S.T.
1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192. The 1971 Montreal Convention contains the same provisions with
respect to individuals who engage in any kind of sabotage of aviation. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570.
The General Assembly has addressed the problem of terrorism directed against diplo-
mats. In 1974, it adopted, by consensus, the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. This con-
vention provides for international cooperation in preventing and punishing attacks against
diplomats and other persons enjoying special status under international law. G.A. Res. 3166,
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
The General Assembly has also condemned hostage-taking. In 1979, it adopted, without
objection, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. International Con-
vention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). The object of the convention is to ensure that those who take
hostages will be subject to punishment if they are apprehended within any state's jurisdic-
tion that is a party to the Convention. States that are parties to the Convention must coop-
erate in the prevention of acts of terrorism. The Convention rejects the concept that pursuit
of equal rights and self-determination can justify terrorist acts. Parties must prosecute or
extradite hostage-takers under the Convention, unless bound to do so under the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention on the Law of Armed Conflict and the 1977 Additional Protocols.
20. The United States is a signatory to the regional agreement of the Convention to
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413.
Other signatories are: Costa Rico, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. Among the most significant obligations, members pledge in Article 8 to take
all measures to prevent the preparation of terrorist acts in their territories, to exchange
information on terrorism, to endeavor to have acts of terrorism outlawed in their own crimi-
nal laws, and to comply with extradition requests by signatories for terrorists.
The United States has also arrived at a common understanding with other industrial-
ized nations regarding the terrorist problem. On June 9, 1984, during the London Economic
Summit, the United States joined with Great Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy,
and Japan in making a Declaration on International Terrorism. Among the most significant
items agreed upon, they pledged: closer cooperation among their security forces in combat-
ting terrorism, a review of their own domestic laws so as to better counter terrorism, review
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the frequency of terrorist acts continues to increase unabated. Moreover,
the United Nations Security Council's record of dealing with specific inci-
dents of terrorism could be characterized as an abysmal failure. Agree-
ment amongst member states are rare regarding the degree to which they
feel that international terrorism poses a threat. Worse still, there is little
evidence that parties to anti-terrorist conventions are engaging in cooper-
ative efforts on any systematic basis.
1. Economic Factors
Economic factors explain, in part, why international bodies have
been unable to come to terms with the terrorist problem. Potential dis-
ruption of trade weakens the willingness of nations to condemn acts of
terrorism. For instance, there is strong evidence of Libyan involvement in
supporting assassinations and other terrorist activity. Yet, the United Na-
tions has not adequately addressed that problem because Libya is an im-
portant trading partner to Western Europe. The potential cost to West-
ern European countries of condemning Libyan acts-denial of large
amounts of trade-is greater than the Europeans are willing to pay.
2. Political Factors
Political factors also explain why international bodies have been una-
ble to come to terms with the terrorist problem. In the United Nations,
the United States has clashed with certain Communist countries who
have been disturbed over American initiatives against terrorism. These
countries feel that a U.S. plan of action, if adopted by the United Na-
tions, would hamper so called "Wars of National Liberation."'" For in-
stance, other Communist nations might feel that any condemnation of
Bulgaria or other Eastern Bloc countries for engaging in terrorism would
be an indictment of Communism as a system, therefore, they should not
support any such condemnation efforts.
3. Legal Factors
Legal factors also explain why international bodies have been unable
to come to terms with the terrorist problem. The prevalent view of the
restrictive nature of the United Nations Charter"2 restrains nations that
would otherwise respond to aggressive acts. The United Nations Security
Council considers a nation's use of force without taking into account any
justification based upon broader political or security contexts.2" This view
clearly limits the occasions on which the use of force is deemed permissi-
ble. The approach rejects, ab initio, any argument based upon the
of weapons sales policies, and consultation with each other regarding known terrorists. 84
DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2089, Aug., 1984, at 4-5.
21. Sloan and Wise, supra note 3, at 57.
22. See infra notes 64, 92, 93, and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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broader context of an "accumulation" of terrorist attacks.24 Further, the
Security Council has adopted a restrictive view of what kind of action is
deemed proportional to a prior illegal act. In determining if a response is
proportional, only events immediately preceding a response are
examined.2
4. United Nations Record
Aside from the economic, political, and legal factors, the United Na-
tion's dismal record in reacting to specific terrorist acts has made policy-
makers more determined than ever to solve the terrorist problem outside
the United Nations framework, and more willing to employ forceful, uni-
lateral acts. Indecisive United Nations responses, such as those following
the hijacking to Entebbe 6 and the militant takeover of the American em-
bassy in Tehran,2 7 are cited as reasons for the growing frustration. More-
over, United Nations inaction despite Israeli requests for Security Coun-
cil condemnation of terrorist Fedayeen activity also has left American




25. Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Repri-
sal Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 19 (1982).
26. On June 27, 1976, four Arab terrorists hijacked an Air Force jet just after take-off
from Athens. The plane was carrying 250 passengers, including 96 Israeli citizens. The hi-
jackers had the pilot fly the airplane to Entebbe, Uganda. There, the passengers were held
hostage in the airport terminal. Non-Israelis were released. After much evidence showed
that the President of Uganda was supporting the hijack operation, and after hopes to solve
the matter appeared futile, Israeli commandos flew to the airport and rescued the hostages.
After the raid, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) submitted a complaint to the
Security Council. The OAU complaint condemned the Israeli rescue attempt to save hos-
tages as an "act of aggression."
Despite strong evidence that the Ugandan government assisted in the hostage-taking
operation, Uganda escaped formal action from the Security Council. The Security Council
would not support a United States/United Kingdom resolution which did not condemn
Uganda, but only the hijacking itself.
See J. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF VIOLENCE, A LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 186-87, 190 (1982).
27. In January, 1979, the Shah of Iran was deposed and left Iran, replaced by the
Ayatollah Khomeini. The United States permitted the Shah entry into the United States for
medical treatment. In protest of his entry, Iranian militants, with the tacit approval of the
Iranian government, seized the American embassy in Iran, taking 66 Americans hostage, and
demanding that the United States return the Shah and his wealth to Iran. The United
States brought the case to the Security Council and before the International Court of Jus-
tice. However, Iran did not comply with the Security Council's resolution calling for the
release of the hostages nor did it recognize the jurisdiction of the court. After American
diplomatic efforts failed to obtain the release of the hostages, the United States launched a
military rescue, which aborted due to helicopter equipment failure.
Though, concededly, United Nations reaction to the incident created an atmosphere
which enabled the adoption of the International Convention Against Hostage-Taking, in the
final analysis, the United Nations proved largely irrelevant to the resolution of the crisis.
Id. at 191-93.
28. See generally Y. TEKOAH, IN THE FACE OF THE NATIONS: ISRAEL'S STRUGGLE FOR
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Thus, it is not surprising that American policy-makers have grown
increasingly disillusioned over the capacity of international bodies to deal
with terrorism. To protect American interests against the threat of terror-
ism, American leadership now ponders new options of self-help in order
to counter terrorist activity. The fact that international terrorism is not
often susceptible to peaceful controls is not a new realization; but this
realization, coupled with a greater willingness to use unilateral action, in-
cluding military action, adds a special exigency to the international
horizon.29
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED POLICY
A. State Responsibility for Terrorist Acts
To determine the legality of any American action against a state that
supports terrorism, the first question that must be asked is whether that
state is internationally liable for the terrorist activity. If the terrorist act
did not originate directly from the government, but instead originated
from independent acts, the question arises whether responsibility for the
terrorist act can be imputed to the government. This issue is central to an
analysis of the international legal implications of the Shultz speech since
that speech urges military and economic sanctions against nations which
engage in, or at least acquiesce to, terrorism.
Under principles of international law, a state bears responsibility
where it permits its territory to be used for terrorist activity; arguably it
is also responsible where such acts are allowed to exist without state
knowledge. Under the principle of external responsibility, one state's vio-
lation of another state's external political or territorial sovereignty is a
delinquency which imposes liability on the offending state.30 All states
have an internationally imposed obligation to refrain from the threat or
use of force (excluding self-defense) against the territorial sovereignty of
another state. This international prohibition also extends to private indi-
viduals acting either independently or on behalf of a state in which they
are located. Two theories exist which impute responsibility to a state for
a violation of an internationally imposed duty: direct liability, and vicari-
ous liability.
PEACE (1976).
However, it may be argued that in view of Israeli occupation of Arab lands, the Council
has chosen to characterize Fedayeen violence as permissible guerilla activity, not terrorist
activity, and therefore has refused to condemn the violence.
29. Pedersen, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force
and Proposals For Multilateral Cooperation, 8 TOLEDO L. REV. 209, 210 (1976).
30. The concept of sovereignty encompasses two aspects of independence. First, under
the principle of "internal independence," the manner in which a state uses its territory is
generally not the subject of international law, provided such use does not endanger other
states. Second, under the principle of "external independence," a state may not unilaterally
alter that external, or internationally imposed responsibility that each state owes to every
other state. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 254-56 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
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1. Direct Liability
The notion of direct responsibility holds a nation liable for acts of
organs of its government." Because (at least publicly) no nations of the
world openly subscribe to the use of "terrorism" as a legitimate tool per
se, this concept is not very helpful in determining state responsibility for
terrorist acts.
2. Vicarious Liability
Under the principle of vicarious liability, a state would be held liable
where it knowingly allows private persons to operate terrorist operations
within its borders. Arguably, a state would also be internationally liable
even where it has no such knowledge. This theory focuses on those pri-
vate acts which may be imputed to the state. The vicarious liability of the
state flows from the recognized duty of a state to exercise reasonable care
to prevent illegal acts which may originate in its territory. Where such
acts occur, the state has a responsibility to either punish wrongdoers or to
compel them to make retribution.
32
If a state is found delinquent by not controlling private individuals in
its territory, vicarious liability may be imputed to the state-based one of
three theories: fault liability, acts on behalf of a state, or absolute
liability.
a. Fault Doctrine
Under the fault doctrine, a state will incur responsibility for hostile
acts committed from its territory, unless the state was unaware of such
conduct, or knew but was unable to prevent the hostile activity.3 This
doctrine has enjoyed enormous support as a legal principle over the years.
This view is implicit in the Corfu Channel case. There, the court con-
cluded that a state's mere control over its territory does not necessarily
establish state responsibility. " The court underscored the principle that a
state is liable if it knowingly permits its territory "to be used for acts
31. Part I of Draft Articles on State Responsibility [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles],
[19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N art. 5, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2).
Under this theory, officials of a government who, while acting in their official capacity, en-
gage in acts of terrorism, act on behalf of the state, therefore, their state is internationally
liable.
32. Gross, The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, 13 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 458, 468-70 (1983).
This principle is stated in The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations. [Hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles of International Law]. That
pronouncement forbids a state's acquiescence of activity within its territory that aims at
fomenting civil war on committing terrorist acts in another state. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
33. W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 242-43
(1979).
34. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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contrary to the rights of other States. 3 5 Application of this principle to
the control of terrorism indicates that although a state is aware of the
presence of terrorist groups in its territory, it will nonetheless escape vi-
carious responsibility if it has no power to prevent hostile acts by that
group or state.
b. Acts on Behalf of the State
Under a second theory, a state will incur responsibility for the of-
fending conduct of persons that act on behalf of the state.3 " Rather than
focusing upon the stated or formal relationship between such persons to
determine whether the state somehow consented, even tacitly, to the of-
fending behavior. The implication of adopting such an approach is that if
a state accepts the benefits derived from actions of persons it knows have
perpetrated an act of terrorism, even after the fact, it may ratify the act
and be held liable.
c. Absolute Liability Doctrine
A broader doctrine which holds the state strictly accountable for acts
within its borders is the doctrine of absolute vicarious liability. According
to this doctrine, a state's mere toleration of the use of its territory as
either a point of departure for incursion into the territory of another state
or as a base of operation is a violation for which a state will be held abso-
lutely liable.3 7 Thus, where private individuals violate international law,
liability will attach to the state from whose territory the individuals per-
petrated the act, regardless of the state's actual complicity or failure to
prevent those same acts. 8 Due to the harshness that this principle works
on a nonaccomplice "innocent" state, this principle has not received wide-
spread acceptance.
3. Application of Principles
The principles of direct liability and vicarious liability, as applied to
American measures against terrorism, may be summarized in the follow-
ing manner. Consistent with customary international law, the use of any
measure is valid only if directed against an entity responsible for the
breach of international law. If the offending conduct is directly attributa-
ble to the government because the country's officials in their official ca-
pacity support terrorism, such as where high government officials actually
engage in a terrorist act, then the government is legally responsible and
may be the object of appropriate economic and military response. With-
35. Id.
36. Draft Articles, supra note 31, art. 8.
37. See Declaration of Principles of International Law, supra note 32.
38. W. Levi, supra note 33, at 235. Due to this principle, it is in a state's best interest
to monitor its territory for terrorist activity, and, if such activity is found, to take measures
to prevent further activity.
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out further inquiry, the government is deemed liable.3 9 The difficult ques-
tion arises when persons engaging in terrorism act independently from
the state in which they operate. In order to take economic or military
action against that state, there must initially exist a nexus between the
government and the group engaging in the terrorist action."0 The thresh-
old nexus is established where nationals commit a breach of international
law, such as conducting terrorist operations, and the government has
failed to act to prevent the deliquency.
A prerequisite to the use of economic or military force against a state
for alleged support of terrorist operations is that that state must be
shown to have a level of active complicity with the terrorist activity that
would deem the connection "substantial." Where evidence exists indicat-
ing such complicity, a state contemplating action against the terrorist-
associated state may infer that the associated state is violating interna-
tional law and so take direct action against that state.41 Given this stan-
dard, were Secretary Shultz's policy adopted which accepts, in some situ-
ations, the use of military force even where evidence of terrorist activity
may not "stand up in an American court of law,' "2 such a policy would
inevitably run into legal difficulties by failing to first establish a requisite
"substantial" connection. It appears evident that a policy that would
stand up in an American court of law is precisely what is necessary to
establish a "substantial" connection.
B. Legal Limits of State Self-Help Measures Involving Economic
Sanctions
Assuming a nation is liable for a given terrorist operation within its
territory, s the next issue is whether economic actions are legally permit-
ted against such subversive centers.
A certain degree of coercion is inevitable in a state's day-to-day in-
teraction with other states." Recognizing this fact, international rules
permit economic reprisals against states found to be violating interna-
tional law.45 Hence, economic sanctions would be legally permissible
39. Salpeter, Armed Reprisals During Intermediacy-A New Framework for Analysis
in International Law, 17 Vt.L. L. REV. 270, 303 (1971).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 304.
42. See supra text accompanying note 18.
43. Some commentators refer to such nations as "subversive centers." Hereinafter, this
writer shall use "subversive center" to label those nations deemed so internationally liable.
44. Dempsey, Economic Aggression and Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab
Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253,
269 (1977).
45. See Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 245, 252
(1976).
The most significant multilateral convention on international trade and economics is
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 4 U.S.T. 6391, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. GATT attempts to insure access to international markets and to
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against states found to be liable for terrorist activity. However, before
such economic reprisals are permissible as a form of self-help, several
conditions must exist: first, there must exist a prior international delin-
quency; second, other means of redress must have been either exhausted
or unavailable; and third, economic measures taken must be limited to
the necessities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done.4
C. Legal Limits of State Self-Help Measures Involving Military Action
Since the United States has enunciated that it is willing to consider
measures of unilateral military action against terrorism (as indicated in
the Shultz speech), another issue which must be addressed is the extent
to which the United States may, if at all, resort on its own to the use of
armed force against states which support terrorism.
Simply because a state supports terrorist activity is not reason
enough to allow other states to employ armed force in response to that
international offense. Other values, such as the maintenance of overall
world order, must be considered. Thus, the kind of armed force employed
against the state, the manner and timing in which it is employed, and the
aim at which the policy is directed, all have a bearing on the ultimate
legality of the measure.
In determining the legality of a nation's use of force, it is paramount
that a sound analysis recognize the signing of the United Nations Charter
as a legal event of profound importance. Since World War II, the vast
majority of nations have become United Nations members. Hence, any
voluntary agreement by those nations may significantly alter customary
international law concerning the agreed subject. Under customary inter-
national principles, much flexibility is given to a state which attempts to
repel violence.47 Generally, those principles view a state's use of force as
permissible in two cases: first, when acting in self-defense;4 8 and second,
to retaliate for past wrongs perpetrated. Therefore, it is important to de-
termine whether the United Nations Charter has in any way limited, ex-
prevent discriminatory tariffs. A member is generally prohibited from imposing export re-
strictions. However, each contracting party may "take any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other
emergency international relation."
46. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 298-99.
47. Those circumstances which allowed a state to use force were construed so broadly
that up until the early part of the Twentieth Century, a state could wage war for virtually
any reason without violating international law. In 1928, the use of past precedent concerning
the use of force was cast into a state of ambiguity when the Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced
war as an instrument of national policy. Nonetheless, since 1928, customary international
principles governing the use of force have been repeatedly invoked by states in order to
justify their actions.
48. Here, "self-defense" is used in the broad sense to include the use of armed force to
ensure the protection of a nation's nationals abroad, and where conditions justifying human-
itarian intervention are met.
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panded, or rejected the doctrines of self-defense or retaliation.4 9
1. Doctrine of Self-Defense
a. Customary International Law and Self-Defense
Since customary international law permits the use of force in self-
defense, it follows that customary principles would permit the use of force
to counter-terrorist activity if such measures could be characterized as
necessitated by "self-defense." Whether such force can be characterized
as "self-defense" becomes a definitional issue.
(i) Anticipatory Self-Defense
International law's customary definition of "self-defense" includes
not only those actions in response to actual attack, but also preemptory
response in anticipation of impending attack.5 0 Under customary princi-
ples, a state need not wait for any armed attack to occur, whether con-
ventional or unconventional." Use of force in the name of self-defense is
permitted where a state reasonably apprehends that it will be the object
of an attack by another entity.5 By examining the practice of states, pub-
licists have been able to identify four preconditions to the permissible use
of force in self-defense. First, there must be an impending threat;53 sec-
ond, there must exist compelling necessity to act in response to coer-
cion;54 third, all practical peaceful procedures have been exhausted; and
fourth, force must be proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed mea-
sures strictly necessary for self-defense.
55
This traditional formulation of the principle of self-defense, incorpo-
rating anticipatory self-defense, is found in the oft-quoted words of
49. Reference to the word "retaliation" in this article is intended to be synonomous
with "armed reprisal."
50. See infra text accompanying note 58.
From its customary origins, the right of anticipatory self-defense was viewed as an inte-
gral part of the right of self-defense. Plato justified the forceful preemption of an immenent
threat in the name of self-preservation. THE LAWS OF PLATO 5 (A. Taylor trans. 1934).
Cisero, Gentilli, and Grotus recognized the right to act against a potential assailant when
faced with immediate and certain danger. See Note, National Self-Defense in International
Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV., 187, 189-90 (1984). So
deeply rooted was this concept, that assurance of its continued vitality as a principle was
made a condition precedent to the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Dempsey, supra note
44, at 310.
51. Gross, supra note 32, at 479.
52. Id. at 483.
53. See infra text accompanying note 58.
54. This element distinguishes the doctrine of self-defense from the doctrine of armed
reprisal. While the latter concept is retributive and past-oriented, the former is forward-
looking and addresses an immediate threat of injury.
55. This element distinguishes the doctrine of self-defense from the doctrine of self-
preservation. Whereas the concept of self-defense justifies only enough action to remove the
pressure of a present threat, the now rejected doctrine of self-preservation would permit
action beyond removal of imminent threat to include more speculative threats.
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American Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case of
1842. 56 Caroline is generally recognized by commentators as authoritative
precedent that self-defense, including the concept anticipatory self-de-
fense, is legal doctrine.57 In Caroline, Secretary Webster formulated spe-
cific standards for the use of self-defense. In correspondence with Lord
Ashburton, Webster wrote that in order for an act to qualify as an exer-
cise of valid self-defense, a state must show that necessity of self-defense
is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no mo-
ment for deliberation." 8 Further, he stated that a state "must establish
that it did nothing unreasonable or excessive, and that admonition or re-
monstrance to the aggressor was impracticable.3 9
Thus, according to customary international law, preemptive action
urged by Secretary Shultz against terrorist activity is legally permissible
if such preemptive action meets the traditional standard of anticipatory
self-defense.
b. United Nations and Self-Defense
The next issue which must be addressed is whether adoption of the
United Nations Charter has changed the customary international law of
self-defense. Despite the clear customary right that would exist for a state
to engage in anticipatory acts when reacting to terrorist activities, the in-
ternational community today remains substantially divided over whether
the United Nations Charter has outlawed anticipatory measures. Under
the Charter, recourse to use of force by self-help is permitted where the
use of force could be justified as a measure of self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter. Article 51 states that the self-defense may be exercised
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security."60
As a modern principle of international law, the right of self-defense
has never been seriously disputed. However, heated debate remains,
largely over definitional problems of interpreting the United Nations
Charter. In particular, debate exists over whether a particular act should
be characterized as "in self-defense" or "aggressive," ' what kind of at-
56. 61 Parliamentary Papers (1843), reprinted in Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (1938). That case involved the burning in American territory of
an American steamer named "Caroline" by Canadian troops. During that time, Americans
were giving military supplies to Canadian rebels in Canada. The American government was
either unwilling or unable to prevent the flow of these supplies. When it appeared to the
Canadians that assistance would continue and that the Caroline posed a threat to Canadian
authority, the steamer was burned.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 89.
59. Id.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
61. Debate exists over whether to characterize an act as anticipatory self-defense, and
hence lawful, or as aggressive, and hence unlawful. Regarding the concept of aggression,
Article 2(3) paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter declares that: "[members shall refrain in their
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tack constitutes sufficient provocation to invoke a self-defense response, 2
and whether the United Nations Article 51 is a principle of limitation or
illustration.
6 3
The view that the Charter only allows for a restrictive right of self-
defense has substantial scholarly support and has apparently been
adopted by the Security Council. Under this "narrow" view of interpret-
ing the term "self-defense," the legitimate unilateral use of force has been
severely limited by the United Nations Charter."' Those scholars argue
that the United Nations Charter prohibits all forms of self-defense with
the exception of Article 51 self-defense. The effect of following this view
is that even a clear breach of international law, such as where a state
openly participates in terrorist activity, does not give rise, by itself, to a
unilateral right of armed response by a state against the terrorism-sup-
porting state.
(i) Criticism of the Narrow View of Self-Defense
Those scholars who argue that the United Nations Charter prohibits
all forms of self-defense other than Article 51 self-defense would be en-
tirely justified in their interpretation if the United Nations security or-
gans had either established the collective machinery to oppose aggression,
or could and would respond quickly on an ad hoc basis.' 5 However, for
the most part, this machinery does not exist. War between nations did
international relations from the threat or use of force against the international integrity or
political independence of any state, or on any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." "Aggression" is defined in Article 2(4) as the "use of armed force by a
state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
state .. "
62. Article 51 states that self-defense may be lawfully exercised against an "armed at-
tack." Debate exists today over the definition of what constitutes an "armed attack." One
view is that even a small isolated incident is sufficient to justify a self-defense response. A
second view looks to the totality of acts to determine whether a systematic campaign exists,
hence constituting "armed attack." A third view requires a government-initiated invasion by
a large organized force in order to constitute an armed attack. A fourth view requires at
least some type of negligence by a state by not restraining the aggressive acts of armed
bands. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 215-16.
63. This final area of dispute is perhaps more of a problem of construction than defini-
tion. One view asserts that Article 51 restricts self-defense only to the occasion when
"armed attack" occurs. A second view is that Article 51 specifically guarantees a right of
self-defense where there is an "attack", but does not enunciate other lawful situations where
self-defense action may be taken.
64. Scholars supporting this view argue that the United Nations Charter expressly lim-
its the use of force to situations of self-defense, or implementation of a decision by a compe-
tent international organization; a state may not be justified in using force in any other situa-
tion. They further argue that given the language of Article 2(4), the international legal order
has expressed its desire to limit self-defense actions to very narrow circumstances. They
argue that Article 51 explicitly condones only one type of legitimate self-defense: the repul-
sion of actual armed attack. The combined effect of Articles 2(4) and 51, they argue, is to
restrict the right of self-defense to the precise wording of Article 51, making that Article the
exclusive source of authority of legitimate recourse to war. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 213.
65. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 309.
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not end with the signing of the United Nations Charter.6" Furthermore,
Article 51 envisions self-defense as an interim right, to be exercised only
when the Security Council assumes responsibility for resolving the dis-
pute and restoring peace. Experience has shown that the Security Council
is incapable of maintaining peace and security because of political bias
wrought by paralysis in the face of Superpower disputes.6 " Lastly, this
"narrow" interpretation ignores the special problems inherent in combat-
ing terrorist actions. For example, states confronting terrorist bombings
often have limited options due to the covert and often fleeting nature of
terrorist activity. In short, the fundamental flaw of the "narrow" view of
self-defense is that by being so restrictive, it allows for and contributes to
situations where justice cannot prevail.68
(ii) Case for a Broad View of Self-Defense
Under a "broad" interpretation of the United Nations Charter, the
use of anticipatory types of counter-measures against terrorist activity
would be permitted. Under this view, the state is left to take such mea-
sures as it feels are necessary to ensure its defense.6 ' Consequently, the
endangered state is not obligated to first seek peaceful resolution if it
reasonably believes that self-defense action is a pressing necessity.70 The
rationale for this view was perhaps best stated by Sir Humphrey Waldoch
when he said ". . . it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter
to compel a defending state to allow an assailant to deliver the first and
perhaps fatal blow . . . [T]o read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the
aggressor's right to the first strike.
71
A "broad" view of self-defense leaves intact the right of self-defense
as it existed before the United Nations Charter. Legal justification for
leaving customary international law intact is that the phrase in Article 51
states: "[niothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-
defense."7 The United Nations Charter neither expressly prohibits nor
allows anticipatory self-defense; therefore, all relevant rules of treaty con-
struction must be considered in its interpretation. Further, it is axiomatic
that treaties only limit the rights of nations to the extent that those na-
tions have explicitly agreed to be so limited. Since the United Nations
Charter does not create new rights, a state's right to engage in those acts
which ensures its own survival is preserved under the United Nations
Charter.
66. Id.
67. Levenfeld, supra note 25, at 20.
68. Id.
69. Gross, supra note 32, at 485.
70. Id.
71. Quoted in Mallison and Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981 Upon
the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 440
(1982).
72. Id. at 420.
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The "legislative history" of the United Nations Charter appears to be
consistent with this "broad" view. The travaux prepatories, to which one
may turn in the case of documentary ambiguity, suggest only that Article
51 should safeguard the existing right of self-defense and not restrict it."3
While the Spanish and English translations of Article 51 use the phrase
"armed attack," three other official languages, including the French ver-
sion, use a broader term, "aggression armee. ' 7' The French version is
generally considered to be the most accurate version of the Article's nego-
tiating history,7 5 and, therefore, Article 51 should be read as authorizing
the use of force in response to any armed aggression, including the threat
of the use of force under Article 2(4). Moreover, in the process of formu-
lating the prohibition of unilateral coercion contained in Article 2(4),
drafters indicated that the traditional permissibility of self-defense was
not intended to be abridged or attenuated; to the contrary, it was to be
preserved and maintained.
7
This interpretation of Article 2(4) is further strengthened by several
post-United Nations Charter events. In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, de-
cided by the International Court of Justice, the Court permitted the use
of force in the face of a strong probability of armed attack. 77 It found that
a defensive use of force intended to affirm rights illegally denied is not
consistent with 2(4).78 Aside from this case, there are other examples in
which the use of preemptive methods were accepted by the international
community as legitimate situations requiring self-defense. They include
the 1962 American naval "quarantine" of Cuba to prevent supplies from
arriving in Cuba that would aid in the arming of Soviet nuclear missiles
on Cuban soil,7 9 and the 1967 Israeli airstrike against Egypt when Israeli
intelligence evidence gave clear indication that an Egyptian attack was
impending."s
c. Degree of Response Permitted: Proportionality
Assuming that the customary right of anticipatory self-defense is
preserved under the United Nations Charter, the next issue which must
be addressed is what degree of response is permissible under the stan-
dards required by the self-defense doctrine? Although no precise formula-
tion exists for determining the permissible amount of violence in response
to an illegal act, it is well settled that the doctrine of self-defense does
permit a use of force necessary to remove any danger which initially war-
73. Gross, supra note 32, at 480.
74. Mallison and Mallison, supra note 71, at 420-21.
75. Id.
76. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 310.
77. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
78. Id.
79. Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National or Collec-
tive Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962).




rants the self-defensive action."1 Despite this standard, disagreement ex-
ists over whether measurement of the danger is limited to immediately
preceeding illegal acts, or can include an "aggregation" of past illegal acts
or an "accumulation of events" to reflect long-term threats. Otherwise
stated, disagreement exists over whether the legality of a response is to be
determined by reference to the prior illegal act which brought it about, or
whether the legality of the response is to be determined by reference to
the whole context of the relationship between involved parties.8 2 Notwith-
standing the wide differences of opinion on this issue, the Security Coun-
cil's position on this matter is clear. The Security Council has formally
condemned as an illegal reprisal any attempt to justify totality of violence
based upon an "accumulation of events." 3 Therefore, regardless of the
outcome of the ongoing debate over permissible levels of violence under-
taken in self-defense, it may be concluded that any American military
response which employs a level of violence which even appears to be
greater than is necessary to counter any immediate terrorist threat is
bound to be met with stiff criticism from the world community.
2. Doctrine of Armed Reprisal
So consistent has been the Security Council's rejection of the "ac-
cumulation of events" theory,"' that recent practice suggests Israel, the
United States, and the United Kingdom are placing less reliance on the
theory, and are now exploring other legal doctrines to provide legal justi-
fication for policies aimed against continued low-level international vio-
lence. Quite striking is the development that Israel has relied less and less
on a self-defense argument and has taken counter-terrorist action which
it openly justifies on the theory of reprisal8 5 Following Israel's lead in
this area, United States policy-makers, as evidenced by the Shultz
speech, are now contemplating employing an armed retaliatory strategy
against terrorism.
Under existing international law, any American policy that would re-
spond to terrorism by using armed reprisal"6 would be illegal since a re-
prisal is not a means of sovereign self-protection; reprisals merely intend
81. Gross, supra note 32, at 487.
82. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4
(1972).
83. Id. at 6-7.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id.
86. Generally, "armed reprisals" are acts of retaliation for violations of law which cause
injury to the a state exercising the reprisal.
By use of the word "armed reprisal" in this article, this writer refers to that which
much of the literature refers to as "peacetime armed reprisal", not "wartime armed repri-
sal." Because the primary purpose of this article is to examine acts of terrorism within the
context of states that are not at war with one another, wartime armed reprisal will not be
discussed.
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to inflict injury for past harm done.8 7 However, new evidence suggests
increased approval by the international community of selective types of
reprisals.
a. Customary International Law
Customary international law permitted armed reprisal as a matter of
self-help within the limits set forth by the Naulilaa case."' The Naulilaa
court framed the essential requirements for legitimate armed reprisal.
These requirements are essentially the same requirements as those re-
quired to justify self-defense. First, in order for the injured state to make
a legitimate reprisal, there must have been a prior illegal act."9 Second,
the injured state must also have attempted to obtain redress from the
offending state for the alleged violation. 90 Lastly, implementation of the
reprisals must not be patently offensive, that is, disproportionate to the
wrong done.
b. Reprisals and the United Nations
In addressing whether forceful reprisals are legally recognized today,
we must again address the issue: to what extent has the United Nations
Charter changed, if at all, the customary international law on this
subject?
Given the prevalent view of interpreting the United Nations Charter,
any armed reprisal by a modern state in response to terrorist activity
would be deemed a forbidden act.9 This view places great reliance on
Article 2 of the Charter which states in pertinent part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated
in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles ...
3. All Members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
87. Other purposes of reprisals are: first, to enforce obedience to international law by
discouraging other illegal conduct; second, to compel a change in policy of a delinquent
state; third, to force a settlement to a dispute which resulted from a breach of international
law by a delinquent state; and fourth, to compel the delinquent state to make reparation for
the harm done. Salpeter, supra note 39, at 277-78.
88. 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012. In that case, three German soldiers were killed by
Portugese soldiers at a Portugese post. The attack was largely the result of misunderstand-
ings between the same German and Portugese soldiers. In response, German forces attacked
Portugese outposts in Angola, a Portugese colony.
89. A prior illegal act may exist where there has been a violation of a decision by an
international tribunal with proper jurisdiction, a violation of an international convention
recognized by opposing states, a violation of a bilateral treaty, or a violation of a customary
rule of international law.
90. Examples of attempted redress would include good faith arbitration or negotiation.
91. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 30, at 156.
VOL. 14:1
COUNTER-TERRORIST STRATEGY
pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
The above view was reaffirmed in the U.N. Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations in Cooperation
Among States, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Oc-
tober 24, 1970. The Declaration maintains that "[s]tates have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."93 In view of the
strong language in these documents, and because the aim of reprisals has
traditionally been solely to punish, there is widespread support for the
proposition that the United Nations Charter has outlawed armed reprisal.
As such, any American military action undertaken against a terrorist sub-
versive center merely to punish the state for supporting terrorist activity
would constitute illegal armed reprisal.
(i) Case for a Broad View of Armed Reprisal and Reinterpretation of
the United Nations Charter
Despite a well settled de jure rejection of the use of armed reprisal as
a legitimate act of state, the use of reprisals as a legitimate state tool is
gaining renewed international support.94 Under an increasingly popular
revisionary interpretation of the United Nations Charter, armed reprisals
taken by nations in response to certain acts of violence appear to have the
approval of the international community, at least in the de facto form.
95
It may be argued that conduct of the United Nations Security Council in
its refusal to condemn what under customary international law would be
"reasonable" reprisals, constitutes a recognition, at least in defacto form,
of the continued vitality of the concept reprisal." This Security Council
practice, however, must be viewed with caution since the Security Coun-
cil's stated position is condemnation of armed reprisal.9 7 Nonetheless, the
emergent position, given the Security Council's failure to condemn "rea-
sonable" reprisals, is that such reprisals hold at least a tacit form of legit-
imacy. One writer has said that among the factors which may affect the
Security Council's acquiescence to a "reasonable" reprisal is the timing of
the reprisal in relation to efforts of peaceful settlement, and how far the
state taking the reprisal has, by its own conduct, provoked the act against
which it subsequently takes reprisal action.98 Recognition of this pattern
of behavior and the clear rejection by the Security Council of the "ac-
cumulation of events" doctrine accounts for the increased readiness of
nations to justify military action in terms of retaliation rather than in
terms of self-defense. It appears that those reprisals undertaken to "pre-
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3, 4.
93. M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-74 (1971).
94. See Bowett, supra note 82, at 26-27.
95. Id. at 10-11.
96. Levenfeld, supra note 25, at 35.
97. Bowett, supra note 82, at 21.
98. Id. at 15-16.
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vent" acts of warfare will likely avoid condemnation.
Within the context of customary international law, several reasons
exist why "reasonable" reprisals should be legally permitted. First, the
United Nations Charter does not rule out armed reprisal as a measure of
self-help. The Charter makes no mention of the words "armed reprisal"
or "retaliation." Second, later authoritative interpretation does not rule
out armed reprisal as a measure of self-help. The Corfu Channel case
indicates that a residual right of reprisal remains in modern international
law since that case apparently ratified a resort to forceful self-help by
allowing a battleship to traverse legally disputed waters. 9 Third, while
the United Nations Charter is essential to the understanding of the right
to implement forceful actions, the Charter should not function as a
straight-jacket to analysis. 100 Interpreting the United Nations Charter as
outlawing all forms of reprisals ignores the realities of a vast array of con-
duct short of war. For instance, a state facing incessant threat of terrorist
attack has no alternative but to use force to protect its territorial integ-
rity and nationals. Despite this reality of the world condition, it is prefer-
able to maintain legal standards to govern the use of armed coercion
short of war, rather than to condemn the use of all kinds of force.10'
Fourth, forbidding all types of reprisal creates a split between the norm
of international law and the actual practice of states. In the long-run, by
creating this divergence, civilized society runs the risk that the substance
of international law will become little more than aspirational slogans. In
the short-run, subscribing to a view of international law which does not
conform to the reality of the practice of states places international law in
the position of acquiring its own "credibility gap."'
0 2
III. POLIcY ANALYSIS
Since terrorism can strike in countless forms, any successful policy
addressing the problem must include a coherent, comprehensive plan, en-
compassing a wide range of responses so as to ensure effective, appropri-
ate levels of response. Therefore, a successful policy must include an as-
sessment of the degree to which a state is involved in a terrorist act, and
suggest useful diplomatic, legal, ideological, economic, and military re-
sponses to acts of terrorism. Furthermore, that policy should make full
use of existing international processes, and urge reform in those interna-
tional processes and laws where appropriate.
A. Policy on Substantial Complicity
As stated previously, sanctions may be made against a state which
has, to a substantial degree, participated in a breach of international
99. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
100. Salpeter, supra note 39, at 288.




law. '3 In determining an appropriate policy toward a state deemed liable
for terrorist activity, other important values must be weighed besides the
importance of countering a terrorist threat. The international commit-
ment to uphold the principle of territorial integrity and the risk that vio-
lence might escalate into wider conflict must be balanced against holding
a state accountable for terrorist activity."0 4 Balancing these concerns, the
United States should not regard a state's toleration nor negligent over-
sight of terrorist activity, as "substantial complicity.' ' 05 However, with
the same concerns in mind, a state's activity should be deemed "substan-
tial complicity" and appropriate sanctions should be levied against it
where it clearly incites, foments, or supports terrorist activity.
0 6
Where a nation fails to control terrorist activity because of the in-
ability of its government to function, 0 7 the greatest amount of care must
be exercised by American leadership to ascertain the precise situation
before weighing the above mentioned concerns. No coercive measures
should be taken by the United States against targets within a state where
terrorists operate when it appears that the state's government is making
an attempt to control terrorist activity, and (assuming American nation-
als are the terrorist victims) either: (1) those prospects of control are not
significantly less than could be accomplished by the United States, or (2)
vital national security interests of the United States are not at stake. In
such cases, the aims of avoiding the escalation of violence and of observ-
ing a state's political independence would outweigh the importance of
holding such a state accountable for any terrorist act. However, the
United States should take action against targets within a state where ter-
rorists operate when it appears that a government's inability to function
has created a political vacuum, enabling a terrorist group to operate, and
(still assuming American nationals are the terrorists-victims) either (1)
prospects of control by the government of the state out of which the ter-
rorists operate are significantly less than could be accomplished by the
United States, or (2) vital national security interests of the United States
are at stake. In such situations, the importance of controlling terrorism
would outweigh the aims of avoiding the escalation of violence and of
observing a state's political independence.
B. Diplomacy, Ideology, and International Claims
In keeping with the general proposition that the United States
should use only the amount of coercive pressure that is necessary to
achieve policy objectives, policy-makers should consider diplomatic, ideo-
logical, and legal options to resolve a crisis precipitated by state sup-
103. Salpeter, supra notes 40, 41, and accompanying text.
104. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 220.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. This was the case of the government of Lebanon in 1982 before the Israeli armed
invasion into that country in that same year.
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ported terrorism. The United States should always make vigorous diplo-
matic protest against states that support terrorism, even if U.S. nationals
are not victims."'0 The United States has an interest in inducing other
states to refrain from engaging in international terrorism, therefore it
should always express privately, through diplomatic channels, its concern
to a state that encourages international terrorism. Ideological public pres-
sure should be brought against the political leadership of a state that sup-
ports terrorist activity. This pressure must be made in such a way that
the same leadership would find it in its best interest not to engage in such
activity in the future. Public pressure and dissemination of information
regarding terrorism acts perpetrated by an elected government should be
directed to that government's nationals, the same perpetrated by a
nonelected government should be directed to the offending state's ideo-
logical allies, with the aim to ideologically isolate the terrorist-supporting
state from the world community. The United States should consider mak-
ing international claims against states that support terrorism. The work
of Richard B. Lillich has concluded that the law of state responsibility
would support, at least in situations where evidence would indicate
"fault" on the part of the respondent state, claims against states for fail-
ure to prevent injuries caused by terrorism, or for a state's failure to ap-
prehend, punish, or extradite terrorists. 0 9 Lillich's study notes that the
most significant problem in asserting such a claim would be the great un-
likelihood that respondent state would acknowledge international respon-
sibility for its actions."0 Nevertheless, the act of formally asserting an
international claim would raise the consciousness of the international
community by focusing on the illegal acts of the respondent state."'
C. Policy on Economic Sanctions
As discussed previously, international law permits unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions by nations which deem the sanctioning appropriate and
in accordance with its vital interests. Thus, the issue of whether to im-
pose unilateral economic sanctions on subversive centers becomes an is-
sue of policy rather than law." 2
For two reasons, the general use of unilateral economic action against
108. J. MURPHY & A. EVANS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 569 (1978).
109. Lillich and Paxman, State Responsibility for Inquiries to Aliens Occasioned by
Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977).
110. Id. at 312.
111. Id.
112. It should be noted that U.S. municipal law allows for sanctioning by the United
States against states which support terrorism. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 authorizes
the President to suspend air traffic with any nation which aids terrorist groups or a nation
that continues air service to a nation encouraging hijacking. 49 U.S.C. para. 1514 (Supp.
1976). The International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act stops military and eco-
nomic assistance to any nation giving sanctuary to international terrorists, unless the Presi-
dent determines that National Security justifies the continuance of such assistance. 22
U.S.C. para. 2371 (Supp. 1976).
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subversive centers should be discouraged. First, diplomatic problems may
be created with United States allies who have strong historical, economic,
or security relationships with a sanctioned state. Second, an economically
sanctioned country could probably find alternative sources of trade
outside the United States."'3 Thus, for economic sanctions to be success-
ful in altering policies of nations supporting subversive centers, such
sanctions must be multilateral.
Unfortunately, multilateral economic sanctions as presently used are
not influential in shaping the policy of a state that has violated interna-
tional law. The primary reason multilateral economic sanctions are not
influential is because of ineffective use by the Security Council." 4 Several
recent sanctioning experiences show that a nation can ignore Security
Council sanctions without it experiencing an adverse impact on its poli-
cies. When the United States sought United Nations imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions on Iran for actively supporting Iran militants who took
hostage American embassy officials in that country," 5 Iran was able to
formally ignore the United Nations call without impunity. Available data
leads to the conclusion that economic sanctions instituted by the United
Nations against Rhodesia were not the impetus behind the creation of a
new state of Zimbabwe."" Security Council sanctioning and weak enforce-
ment by member states has in practice rendered the use of United Na-
tions economic sanctions useless.1 17 In the Rhodesian sanctioning effort,
United Nations sanctions came too later, and were applied too gradually
in order to operate as a tool to force Rhodesia to comply with interna-
tional law. The Security Council did eventually initiate a full compliment
of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia, but this came over six
years after the United Nations first took cognizance of the situation.'18
Taking into account the interdependent and competitive environ-
ment in which international economic sanctions must operate, any reform
to improve the effectiveness of these sanctions must come from a more
sophisticated use of multilateral sanctions. Once an international delin-
113. Here, a lessen should be taken from the American response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979. In response to that invasion, the United States suspended exports of
agricultural goods and items of high technology to the Soviet Union. At least with respect to
agricultural goods, the Soviets were able to find alternative sources. Since the American
farmers' enormous grain market with the Soviets was eliminated, those farmers alone were
made to bear the brunt of American economic sanctioning.
114. United Nations Article 41 provides the Security Council with the authority to use
economic sanctions; the Security Council may decide what measures are to be employed to
give affect to its decisions, and it may call upon United Nations members to apply such
measures. The Security Council's Article 41 decisions are binding on members, but are not
self-executing. Actual legal obligations that arise depend upon each member state's own
legislation. Polakas, Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative to Military Coercion?, 6
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289, 305 (1980).
115. See supra note 27.
116. Polakas, supra note 114, at 316.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 312.
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quency is found, a decision as to whether to impose Article 1 sanctions
should be made forthwith. In making that decision, net costs to the inter-
national community, and costs to individual states, should be weighed
against net benefits derived by the international community as a whole. If
a decision is made to employ Article 1 sanctions, those sanctions must be
imposed quickly and decisively. Since economic sanctioning pressure is
slow to affect a targeted territory, such pressure should not be hampered
further by slow implementation. The target's trading partners must be
monitored in order to ensure compliance with multilaterally imposed
sanctions. Where violations of such sanctions are found, they must be met
with a firm response. In every case where implementation of multilateral
economic sanctions is considered, the cost of enforcement must be added
to the costs incurred due to the loss of the market.'
D. Policy on Military Measures
Because diplomatic, ideological, legal, and economic measures may
fail to bring sufficient coercive pressure against a state that supports ter-
rorism, the United States must explore the use of military measures in
applying pressure against such states. The Shultz speech urges the adop-
tion of a more active strategy to counter terrorism fashioned after the
policy adopted by the Israeli government.' From the context of the
speech, it may be inferred that Shultz supports an American policy simi-
lar to Israeli military policy against terrorism. While both the United
States and Israel have policies that do not yield to terrorist demands, a
fundamental difference has existed between their respective policies.
While the U.S. policy to date has been largely a defensive response to
terrorist activity, Israeli policy assumes an offensive stance. U.S. policy
has been to punish specifically those individuals who actually carry out
an overt terrorist attack. The U.S. response is not brought to bear until
specific acts of terrorism are under way. As opposed to this American pat-
tern of behavior, Israeli policy concentrates on the source; thus terrorist
leadership and supporters are not immune from counter-strikes. 2 1
Arguably, legal precedent exists for the notion that the doctrine of
armed reprisal is available to all nations.1 2 2 Sound policy reasons may
even exist for some nations to make use of armed reprisal. It is arguable
that an Israeli policy of armed reprisal has deterred many terrorist acts
that would have otherwise have occurred. Even were such an assertion is
shown to be true, American policy-makers should not conclude on that
basis alone that it is in the United States's best interest to adopt such a
policy. The United States, in its own national interest, should not use
force against subversive centers where reprisal is the only basis for its
action. The United States is a superpower, and with that status is carried
119. Id. at 317-18.
120. See Shultz, supra notes 10-12.
121. Sloan and Wise, supra note 3.
122. See the Nautilaa Case, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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a great deal of influence. Because of that status, any armed reprisal by
the United States against subversive centers would be more apt to result
in response by the Warsaw Pact'2 3 than were a reprisal undertaken by a
nonsuperpower nation, such as Israel. Given this status, an American pol-
icy of armed reprisal against subversive centers may do more to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security than the initial ter-
rorist activity. 24 The values that would lead to a sounder policy of Amer-
ican nonreprisal against terrorist centers are the same ones that led Presi-
dent John Kennedy to a successful, peaceful resolution of the Cuban
missile crisis. One incident resulting in death is not sufficient reason to
catapult a nation of superpower status into war.'2"
Given the great confusion that exists over whether the concept of
self-defense includes the customary form of anticipatory self-defense,12
the United States should urge the clear recognition of the anticipatory
doctrine, since to take the contrary position would protect an aggressor's
first strike.1 2 7 In an era of sophisticated terrorist methods 28 and long
range nuclear ballistic missiles, it is unrealistic for an endangered state in
all circumstances to wait until devastation before a response is taken.
Further, it is notoriously difficult to maintain an adequate defense system
which relies upon meeting attacks incident by incident, as in the case of
continued harassment by terrorists. Since legal precedent does exist to
support the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, 129 the United States
should leave open the option of engaging in preemptive action where es-
sential to national security. However, the United States should take pre-
emptive action against a terrorist-supporting state only where conditions
are such that a state is deemed from legal' 30 and policy' viewpoints to
have participated to a substantial degree'3 2 in a terrorist act, conditions
meet the requirements for customary anticipatory self-defense3 3 and con-
ditions are such that the prospective benefits of engaging in the self-de-
fensive action outweigh the prospective costs wrought by escalation in
123. The Warsaw Pact has sometimes been described as the Eastern Block's counter-
part to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is the military alliance among
Soviet Satellite countries and the Soviet Union.
124. J. MURPHY & A. EVANS, supra note 108, at 556.
125. During the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one United States Air Force officer,
Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed by a surface-to-air missile while flying a reconnaissance
mission over Cuba. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS, A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
97-98 (1968).
126. See notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
127. See Mallison and Mallison, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
128. See Sloan and Wise, supra notes 3 and 4.
129. See notes 51-59, 77-80, and accompanying text.
130. See note 41 and accompanying text.
131. See notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
132. Where legal and policy aspects of "substantial complicity" are met, not only is a
terrorist-supporting nation deemed accountable under international law, but it is in Ameri-
can best interest that enforcement measures be levied against such a nation.
133. See notes 53, 54, 55, and accompanying text.
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violence.
The United States should urge the adoption of more flexible stan-
dards in measuring the amount of force permissible under the doctrine of
self-defense. Presently, the Security Council measures the legality of such
force by strict reference to a prior illegal act." 4 The artificiality of such a
measurement does not permit a clear reflection of the traditionally hostile
parties. Indeed, it favors the party which engages in a "continuous war"
consisting of "isolated" terrorist acts. Such a measurement of response
places at a decisive disadvantages any party which first chooses to use
violence. The responding party is left only to treat the symptoms of the
illegality and not to cure the illness. The better view, allowing for a mea-
surement of threat based upon an "accumulation of events,"' 135 would be a
highly probative approach in ascertaining the reasonableness by which a
responding state perceived that a danger was imminent. In the meantime,
given the stated position of the Security Council, any decision to utilize
an American counter-strike would be wise to limit the level of counter-
terrorist violence to an amount corresponding to the immediately prior
terrorist act.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the mounting number of terrorist acts perpetrated against
American citizenry, it is altogether natural that American policy-makers
should feel perplexed by their inability to control international terrorism.
Nonetheless, in their desire to counter the threat of terrorism, policy-
makers must be cautious not to translate their frustrations into policies
which though in the short-term might remove an immediate terrorist
threat, violate cherished international principles of law, or are in the
long-term counter-productive to either better national security or a more
peaceful world order. Since the Shultz strategy of more active counter-
terrorist actions potentially suffers in part from these deficiencies, that
proposed policy must be reconsidered. In the short-term, it aims to re-
move a terrorist threat by asserting a more active use of economic and
military measures, but in the long-term it may prove counter-productive
by holding nations accountable for terrorist acts without regard to any
high level of complicity. By not giving full consideration to the uniquely
powerful position of the United States in the world community, and by
advocating an active use of military measures that have as their tradi-
tional purpose the intent to punish, rather than to deter, the United
States stands to lose more than it could ever gain. A sounder approach to
the terrorist problem would recognize the international legal constraints
to unilateral national action and see the advantages of self-restraint, but
where necessary, bring the appropriate level of coercion to bear on those
which support terrorist activity.
134. See note 83 and accompanying text.
135. See notes 82, 83, and accompanying text.
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